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I. INTRODUCTION 
 Paradoxically, contracts are both never complete and always com-
plete.1 Contracts are never fully complete, because some contractual 
incompleteness is inevitable, given the costs of thinking about, bar-
gaining over, and drafting for future contingencies.2 In addition, con-
tracting parties may sometimes leave contracts incomplete on pur-
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 1. See infra Part II.A (discussing “obligationally incomplete” and “contingently in-
complete” contracts). We do not dispute the notion that contracting parties can allocate 
even unforeseen risks contractually by doing so at a broad level.  See George G. Triantis, 
Contractual Allocation of Unknown Risks: A Critique of the Doctrine of Commercial Im-
practicability, 42 U. TORONTO L.J. 450, 468 (1992). Instead, we contend that the RSI de-
fault proposed here promotes the cost-effective allocation of such risks at a more precise 
level. 
 2. Some contracts are more prone to incompleteness than others. Specifically, long-
term contracts or contracts that attempt to memorialize a set of intricate obligations on the 
part of the parties may be subject to both more uncertainty as to future conditions and 
greater complexity in the nature of what is required of the contracting parties. Charles J. 
Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV. 1089, 1091 
(1981) (defining “relational contracts”). 
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pose, either because one or both of the parties withhold information 
necessary to complete the contract, or because the parties have de-
termined to “agree to agree later.” 
 At the same time, contracts are always obligationally complete, 
because in order for a court to enforce the contract, it must conclude 
that the material terms are sufficiently complete that the intent of 
the parties can be determined. In such a case, the court will opt to 
gap-fill any incomplete terms. In this sense, contracts are always 
complete, since either the court will fill any incomplete terms for the 
parties or the contract is not enforceable.3 
 When parties enter into a complete contract, they specify—
optimally—their rights and obligations in every future state of the 
world. Because the original contract lays out the optimal set of obli-
gations and rights in every future contingency, the parties never 
need to alter obligations in light of new information or the resolution 
of uncertainty.   In other words, they never renegotiate or breach the 
contract. As noted, however, parties fail to reach such contractual 
completeness for a variety of reasons, meaning that contracting par-
ties frequently renegotiate, breach, and litigate as new information 
becomes available and unforeseen events unfold.   
 Economists and legal scholars long have recognized that this in-
evitable contractual incompleteness creates two types of investment 
problems: underinvestment and overinvestment. Both of these in-
vestment problems are measured against the efficient investment 
level—that is, the investment level that maximizes the gains from 
the contractual arrangement. 
 Incomplete contracts present a danger of underinvestment be-
cause, to the extent that the parties’ obligations are not optimally 
specified in the contract, an opportunity arises to renegotiate those 
obligations in the future. This renegotiation raises the prospect of 
opportunistic behavior—during renegotiation, one or both parties 
may attempt to garner a higher fraction of the gains from continuing 
to trade. If the parties can easily switch to alternative bargaining 
partners, then both can walk away from the existing relationship and 
these attempts at holdup will fail. However, the greater the relation-
ship-specific investment that a party has made in contemplation of 
performing on the agreement—for example, nonrecoupable expendi-
tures, information sharing, specialization, training, etc.—the more 
vulnerable she will be to holdup attempts by her partner. Recogniz-
ing this, parties will be reluctant to engage in relationship-specific 
                                                                                                                      
 3. Omri Ben-Shahar, “Agreeing to Disagree”: Filling Gaps in Deliberately Incomplete 
Contracts, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 389, 399 n.25 (“[B]y its legal definition a ‘contract’ cannot be 
incomplete.”). 
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investment in the face of contractual incompleteness, unless some 
resolution to the holdup problem can be found.  
 On the other hand, coupled with a damage remedy, contractual 
incompleteness also can lead to overinvestment. In some future con-
tingencies, the parties are better off not trading, even though the 
contract requires them to do so. In this state, the damage remedy 
guarantees the investing, nonbreaching party a certain return, even 
though the investment has no social value (the parties will not be 
trading and the investment only has value if the relationship contin-
ues). Anticipating this guaranteed return, the contracting party may 
invest too heavily in the relationship.  
 Economists have analyzed at length the mechanisms for avoiding 
the potential inefficient investment problems that accompany con-
tractual incompleteness. The mechanisms typically suggested are 
complex contractual arrangements4 or asset ownership—that is, the 
firm.5 The complex contractual arrangements are rarely observed in 
practice,6 and it is well recognized that asset ownership is not always 
a practical response to contracting problems.7 
 Given the dangers of inefficient investment created by contractual 
incompleteness and the limited practicability of the drafting and 
ownership solutions, what can the parties do or, more specifically, 
what can contract law do to approximate the incentives and invest-
ment levels that would be reached in the presence of a perfectly com-
plete contract? In this Article, we argue that, although contract law 
may be unable to replicate the optimal contract envisioned by eco-
                                                                                                                      
 4. Philippe Aghion et al., Renegotiation Design with Unverifiable Information, 62 
ECONOMETRICA 257 (1994); Tai-Yeong Chung, Incomplete Contracts, Specific Investments, 
and Risk Sharing, 58 REV. ECON. STUD. 1031 (1991); Aaron S. Edlin, Cadillac Contracts 
and Up-Front Payments: Efficient Investment Under Expectation Damages, 12 J.L. ECON. 
& ORG. 98 (1996); Aaron S. Edlin & Stefan Reichelstein, Holdups, Standard Breach Reme-
dies, and Optimal Investment, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 478 (1996).  
 5. OLIVER HART, FIRMS, CONTRACTS, AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE 29-33 (1995); San-
ford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Ver-
tical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691 (1986); Benjamin Klein et al., Vertical 
Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 
297 (1978). But see R.H. Coase, The Acquisition of Fisher Body by General Motors, 43 J.L. 
& ECON. 15, 16 (2000) [hereinafter Coase, Acquisition] (arguing there is no evidence that a 
holdup occurred); R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm: Origin, Meaning, Influence, 4 J.L. 
ECON. & ORG. 3 (1988) [hereinafter Coase, Nature of the Firm] (expressing skepticism re-
garding the importance of vertical integration in addressing problems of asset specificity 
and arguing that satisfactory contractual solutions exist to the holdup problem).    
 6. Eric A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Contract Law After Three Decades: Success 
or Failure?, 112 YALE L.J. 829, 859 (2003) (“The contracts that the models predict do not 
exist in the world.”). 
 7. Goetz & Scott, supra note 2, at 1094; Victor P. Goldberg, The Law and Economics 
of Vertical Restrictions: A Relational Perspective, 58 TEX. L. REV. 91, 96, 120 (1979); Oliver 
E. Williamson, Assessing Vertical Market Restrictions: Antitrust Ramifications of the 
Transaction Cost Approach, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 953, 970-72 (1979). 
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nomic models, it can reduce the problems of inefficient investment 
associated with incomplete contracts.   
 As noted, because an incomplete contract is unenforceable unless 
a court chooses to fill gaps and resolve ambiguities in the contract, a 
contract—if it legally exists at all—is never really obligationally in-
complete. This alone, however, does not resolve the potential for inef-
ficient investment associated with incomplete contractual arrange-
ments. Unless courts choose to fill gaps and resolve ambiguities in a 
manner that minimizes the incentives to over- or underinvest, con-
tracts that are completed by courts will not mitigate problems of inef-
ficient investment and may even exacerbate them. 
 We propose a default rule of contractual gap-filling and interpre-
tation (an “RSI default”) that applies to incomplete contracts only 
when one of the contracting parties has made a relationship-specific 
investment (an “RSI”). Subject to a notice requirement, the RSI de-
fault fills gaps and resolves ambiguities in the contract in favor of the 
party making the RSI.8 As a result, it allocates bargaining power 
during renegotiation of the contract to the investing party. By allo-
cating renegotiation power to the contracting party most likely to fall 
victim to holdup (that is, the relationship-specific investor), the RSI 
default encourages contracting parties to make such investments. 
 In addition, because the RSI default must not encourage ineffi-
cient overinvestment, we propose that, in order to gain the benefit of 
the RSI default, the relationship-specific investor must provide no-
tice of such investment to the noninvesting party.9 The notice re-
quirement reduces the incentive to overinvest or behave strategically 
(when a party invests in the relationship simply to trigger the RSI 
default). If the proposed investment is inefficient—the investment is 
unlikely to create a surplus that the parties can divide through side 
payments—the noninvesting party can object. Furthermore, the no-
tice requirement encourages contracting parties aware of a contrac-
tual gap or ambiguity to share that information with their contract-
ing partners. As such, the RSI default encourages contracting parties 
                                                                                                                      
 8. We address the informational burden on courts making this inquiry infra Part V. 
The court does not have to observe or verify perfectly investment levels for the RSI default 
to increase contractual surplus. All that is needed is for the court to observe a signal corre-
lated with the investment 
 9. Under the notice requirement, the parties do not contract directly on investments 
(which, if they could, would render the whole investment problem moot). Instead, one party 
proposes a broad (and perhaps nonquantifiable) investment plan. The other party wants to 
induce the investment but cannot make a contractual commitment directly on that invest-
ment. So, instead, by not objecting to the plan, the noninvesting party triggers the RSI de-
fault. This is a credible commitment to refrain from causing a holdup because, under the 
default, all interpretation disputes are decided in favor of the investing party. With this 
commitment in hand, the investing party proceeds with the investment plan and splits the 
gains from trade with the noninvesting party. 
2006]                          INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS 729 
 
to address significant contractual incompleteness at an early stage 
and to address the incompleteness on their own through renegotia-
tion or contract language clarification. Even in cases where this re-
negotiation fails, the RSI default and notice requirement serve to re-
duce the level of wasted relationship-specific investment, by forcing 
litigation at an earlier stage than might otherwise occur.  
 We do not claim that the RSI default replicates what the parties 
could achieve through perfect contracting. Instead, we contend that 
contract law itself, through a careful application of good faith, inter-
pretation, and gap-filling, can mitigate the investment obstacles in-
herent in incomplete contracts. And, in many cases, this will be a 
more cost-effective mechanism than either asset ownership or com-
plicated contractual arrangements. In addition, the RSI default pro-
vides the added benefit of lending guidance to courts faced with alle-
gations of opportunism and bad faith. As discussed in Part III.B of 
this Article, courts struggle with the issue of good faith. What is it? 
How is it defined? Fortunately, economists have studied the condi-
tions under which threats are credible and opportunistic behavior is 
likely to occur. We employ the insights from this “theory of the firm” 
literature to develop the RSI default.10 
 Nor does the RSI default perfectly balance the incentives to over- 
and underinvest. We assume, however, that for most long-term con-
tracts the holdup effect outweighs the overinvestment effect. That is 
to say, in most future contingencies for most long-term arrange-
ments, the parties prefer continuing to trade. Given this assumption, 
the RSI default favors the investing party in any interpretive dis-
pute, provided that notice has been given. In those cases where this 
assumption does not hold, the parties have two options: (1) a non-
investing party concerned with overinvestment can object at the no-
tice stage, carefully clarifying the level of investment that she will 
accept, or (2) write a contract with a large upfront deposit.11   
                                                                                                                      
 10. The “theory of the firm” has been a focal point of the corporate law scholarly com-
munity. See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991); William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory 
of the Firm: Critical Perspectives from History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1989). In helping 
courts police and uncover contractual opportunism, this Article shows how the theory of 
the firm informs more than just corporate law. Another contract scholar, Gillian Hadfield, 
has noted the role that good faith can and should play in maintaining investments in one 
specific contractual context: franchisor/franchisee contracts. See Gillian K. Hadfield, Prob-
lematic Relations: Franchising and the Law of Incomplete Contracts, 42 STAN. L. REV. 927 
(1990). She finds that that the implied good faith standard encourages relationship-specific 
investment by the franchisee. Id. at 984-87. This Article’s argument is much broader. It 
shows that, whenever one contracting party has made a relationship-specific investment, 
an analysis of that investment and the resulting renegotiation bargaining power is critical 
to any interpretation, gap-filling, or good faith inquiry, no matter the contractual context.   
 11. See Edlin, supra note 4, at 99-101 (discussing how parties can use up-front depos-
its to counter overinvestment).  
730  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:725 
 
 The economic justifications for the RSI default are the same as for 
other contractual default rules: reducing transaction costs and forc-
ing information.  As with any other default rule, parties can opt out 
of the RSI default if they anticipate that investment levels will not be 
an issue; in fact, the notice requirement encourages them to do so.  
 After discussing the reasons for contractual incompleteness, Part 
II of this Article places the RSI default in the context of the broader 
economic and legal literatures. Part II.A briefly reviews the holdup 
problem. Part II.B describes the dominant solution to holdups—
ownership—and demonstrates that contractual default rules play a 
similar role in allocating ex post bargaining power. Part II.C consid-
ers the overinvestment associated with standard damage remedies 
and illustrates how the RSI default guards against this problem.  
 Part III illustrates the application of the RSI default as compared 
to alternative defaults through a discussion of cases and doctrines.  
Specifically, Part III demonstrates that the RSI default demands lit-
tle from courts that they are not called upon to do already when ad-
dressing allegations of bad faith or opportunism, or when applying 
many majoritarian default rules. We begin in Part III.A with the 
“agreement to agree”—a classic case of contractual incompleteness. 
This Part demonstrates the superiority of the RSI default as com-
pared to alternative defaults in addressing the issues posed by the 
much-discussed case of Krantz v. BT Visual Images, L.L.C.12 Part 
III.B demonstrates the relationship between the RSI default and a 
good faith inquiry using the specific case of Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. 
Gulf Oil Corp.13 Part III.C discusses the interpretation of require-
ments and output contracts more generally, and Part III.D addresses 
general rules of contract interpretation.  
 Part IV provides some preliminary thoughts on the case of two-sided 
relationship-specific investment, while Part V explores the informa-
tional burdens placed on the courts by the RSI default, arguing that the 
informational requirements are manageable. Part VI concludes.  
II.   OPTIMAL RELATIONSHIP-SPECIFIC INVESTMENT AND THE HOLDUP 
PROBLEM 
A.   The Inevitability of Incomplete Contracts 
 In the economic model, contracts are “contingently incomplete” 
because, under the contractual language, the parties do not maxi-
                                                                                                                      
 12. 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 209 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001); see also Robert E. Scott, A Theory of 
Self-Enforcing Indefinite Agreements, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1641, 1655-57 (2003) (discussing 
Krantz). 
 13. 415 F. Supp. 429 (S.D. Fla. 1975). 
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mize the gains from trade in every future contingency.14 In the legal 
model, contracts are “obligationally incomplete” because, whether de-
liberately or by accident, contracting parties fail to fully specify at 
the outset of their relationship all of their rights and obligations un-
der the contract.15 Because obligationally incomplete contracts are 
also contingently incomplete, the result of an obligationally incom-
plete contract is that, in some contingencies, the parties will want to 
reallocate their contractual commitments in light of new situations 
or circumstances not considered in the initial contract.16    
 When neither party has made investments that are specific to the 
relationship, they will either renegotiate to reach a mutually benefi-
cial outcome or will walk away from the relationship. However, when 
one or both parties have invested in assets that are relationship-
specific and it is in both parties’ interest to continue to trade, the po-
tential for holdup arises.  
 By definition, relationship-specific investments lose significant 
value if the relationship between the parties does not continue and, 
as a result, create an opportunity for exploitation. At the time of re-
negotiation, a contracting party may attempt to hold up her partner 
who has made a relationship-specific investment, trying to garner a 
higher fraction of the gains from continuing to trade. Knowing this, 
contracting parties will be reluctant to make relationship-specific in-
vestments, even if those investments would increase the surplus 
generated by the contractual relationship. Accordingly, inefficient in-
vestment may result. 
B.   The Ownership Solution 
 The dominant solution offered to the holdup problem is owner-
ship. As discussed in this Part, ownership addresses the holdup prob-
lem by providing one party—the owner—with leverage in contract 
renegotiation. As a result, such ownership encourages relationship-
specific investments that might not occur in the absence of this lev-
erage. As we demonstrate in the following Part III.C, however, con-
                                                                                                                      
 14. Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal 
Choice of Legal Rules, 101 YALE L.J. 729, 730 (1992). 
 15. Id. 
 16. In theory, at least, contingently incomplete contracts need not be obligationally 
incomplete. However, because most contracts do not have liquidated damages clauses, 
most contracts—including contingently incomplete contracts—are obligationally incom-
plete. As demonstrated by Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner, courts can use damages for 
breach of contract to address both types of contractual incompleteness, and excuse doc-
trines, such as impossibility and impracticability, perform precisely this function. Id. at 
731. Because the focus is on gap-filling default rules, this Article addresses mechanisms for 
addressing contingently incomplete contracts only when such contracts are also obligation-
ally incomplete. As noted, however, this will be the case in most instances. 
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tractual default rules create the same renegotiation leverage as own-
ership and, in many cases, do so more cost effectively. 
 Economists have analyzed at length the holdup problem caused by 
contingently incomplete contracts and the extent to which ownership 
is necessary to resolve that problem.17 For example, Oliver Hart ap-
proaches the holdup problem by noting that, because contracts are 
incomplete, the ex post allocation of power—that is, the outside op-
tions available to a party if the other party does not perform—affects 
the outcome of any renegotiation.18 He notes that, although a contin-
gently complete contract would perfectly eliminate the holdup prob-
lem, because contingently complete contracts do not exist, ownership 
of assets is an important source of power that enhances one’s relative 
position during renegotiation.  
 To see how the power of residual control rights can mitigate the 
holdup problem, consider the example of General Motors (GM) and 
Fisher Body.19 In 1919, Fisher Body signed a ten-year contract under 
which it agreed to supply car bodies to GM, which GM then turned 
into final automobiles.20  According to the traditional account, unex-
pected increases in the demand for GM cars during 1925-26 provided 
an opportunity for Fisher Body to hold up GM over the price that 
Fisher could charge GM on sales exceeding the number covered in 
the original contract and by a refusal of Fisher Body to locate its pro-
duction facilities closer to GM in order to keep costs down.21 As a re-
sult, the GM-Fisher Body contractual relationship broke down dur-
ing 1925-26, culminating with GM’s acquisition of Fisher Body in 
1926.   
 Roughly speaking, there were three possible ownership structures 
that could have governed the GM-Fisher Body relationship: the two 
firms could be independent, as was the case until 1926; the two firms 
could integrate, with GM buying all the capital assets of Fisher Body, 
                                                                                                                      
 17. Klein et al., supra note 5 (predicting that vertical integration, rather than renego-
tiation, will likely be the solution to postcontractual opportunistic behavior). But see Coase, 
Nature of the Firm, supra note 5 (disputing the need of vertical integration as a solution). 
See generally HART, supra note 5, at 73-88 (discussing in detail the holdup problem). 
 18. HART, supra note 5, at 2-4. 
 19. There is a great deal of debate over whether the Fisher Body-GM incomplete con-
tract is really an example of attempted holdup. Compare Klein et al., supra note 5, at 308-
10 (using GM-Fisher Body to illustrate the vertical integration solution to the holdup prob-
lem), and Benjamin Klein, Fisher-General Motors and the Nature of the Firm, 43 J.L. & 
ECON. 105 (2000) (defending the GM-Fisher Body example against critics), with Coase, Ac-
quisition, supra note 5, at 18-19 (contending that Klein errs in his description of the facts 
of the GM-Fisher Body case), Ramon Casadesus-Masanell & Daniel F. Spulber, The Fable 
of Fisher Body, 43 J.L. & ECON. 67 (2000) (arguing that Fisher Body-GM is not an example 
of the holdup problem), and Robert F. Freeland, Creating Holdup Through Vertical Inte-
gration: Fisher Body Revisited, 43 J.L. & ECON. 33 (2000) (same).  
 20. Klein et al., supra note 5, at 308. 
 21. Id. at 308-10. As noted supra note 19, the traditional account is disputed. 
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as it did in 1926; or Fisher Body could purchase all the assets of 
GM.22 Hart demonstrates that the various potential ownership struc-
tures present different ex post allocations of power. When GM owns 
Fisher, GM is the party with power during renegotiation.23 As a re-
sult, Fisher’s threat of holdup is substantially reduced and GM will 
be more inclined to invest in the relationship. In contrast, Fisher’s 
renegotiation power is substantially reduced. As a result, Fisher may 
be reluctant to make investments that pay off only if its relationship 
with GM continues.24  
 In summary, although the holdup problem may lead to underin-
vestment, holdup problems can be mitigated if the party subject to 
the holdup has sufficient bargaining power during the renegotiation 
stage. Although ownership is one mechanism for allocating this 
power, it is not the only mechanism. As will be shown in Part II.C, 
contractual default rules may also play this role.25  
C.   The Impossibility of Incomplete Contracts— 
A Theory of Default Rules 
 Although contracting parties inevitably leave gaps and ambigui-
ties in contractual language, contracts are never really obligationally 
incomplete. As discussed in this Part, whenever contracting parties 
fail to sufficiently specify their rights and obligations under the con-
tract, contract law does it for them—either affirmatively, by impos-
ing obligations and filling gaps, or negatively, by refusing to impose 
affirmative obligations and fill contractual gaps. As a consequence, 
                                                                                                                      
 22. HART, supra note 5, at 30-33. 
 23. To be precise, Hart’s model focuses on relationship-specific investments in human 
capital. Id. at 31-33. These investments are made by the management of Fisher or GM. If GM 
owns Fisher, GM can replace the management and run the car-body factory itself. Id. at 31. If 
GM and Fisher are independent, GM does not have this option because it lacks access to the 
physical capital of Fisher. Id. Ownership increases GM’s outside options because it can con-
tinue to produce car bodies (with a new management team at Fisher), even if the contract 
with Fisher fails. Id. at 31-32. Without ownership, in the event the contract between GM and 
Fisher fails, GM has to build a new car body factory to fulfill its needs. Id. 
 24. Since ownership by one party precludes ownership by the other party, Hart dem-
onstrates that only the second-best amount of relationship-specific investment is possible. 
Id. at 51. Further, Hart shows that integration is optimal when the physical assets are 
complementary, and nonintegration is optimal when the physical assets are independent. 
Id. at 50-53.  
 25. This Article does not imply that ownership and court enforcement are the only 
mechanisms for dealing with holdup problems. The role of extralegal enforcement mecha-
nisms, such as reputational constraints, reciprocity concerns, and repeated interactions, in 
reducing holdup are well noted in the literature. See, e.g., HART, supra note 5, at 66-68 
(noting that long-term contracts are self-enforcing until unexpected changes in market 
conditions cause one party to turn to the courts); Scott, supra note 12, passim (discussing 
self-enforcing contracts). Indeed, scholars have shown that extralegal sanctions can some-
times allow parties to completely opt out of the legal enforcement of contracts. Lisa Bern-
stein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond 
Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992).  
734  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:725 
 
contract law default rules allocate bargaining power during renego-
tiation in much the same way that ownership does.  
 To illustrate, consider the example of a contract for the sale of 
goods in which the parties specify the quantity of goods to be deliv-
ered, the date of delivery, and all other terms other than the price. If 
the seller’s cost of performing under the contract increases, she may 
seek to avoid delivering under the contract. By charging the court to 
fill in a “reasonable price,” U.C.C. section 2-305 completes the con-
tract for the parties.26 Because of the gap-filler, the buyer can de-
mand delivery at a reasonable price and sue the seller for breach of 
contract if she fails to deliver.  
 The default rule in this case allocates some power to the buyer 
during the renegotiation of the price term and, in so doing, sets the 
starting point for new talks and discussions. Although the parties 
may end up agreeing to a higher price than the default price, espe-
cially if the buyer has made relationship-specific investments or the 
damage remedy for breach by the seller fails to make the buyer 
whole, the “reasonable price” default rule sets the parameters of the 
renegotiation, providing the buyer with some leverage. 
 The extent of that leverage will depend on a variety of factors, in-
cluding the parties’ expectation about how the court will define the 
term “reasonable price.” In this manner, the set of default rules allo-
cates bargaining power among the parties, dictating how much 
power each has during renegotiation. For example, a definition of 
“reasonable price” that accounts for the seller’s increased costs pro-
vides the buyer with less leverage than a rule that defines “reason-
able price” in a manner that fails to account for the seller’s altered 
cost of performance. 
 Alternatively, assume that the same buyer and seller fail to spec-
ify the quantity of the good to be delivered but do specify a sale price. 
Again, if the seller’s cost of performing under the contract increases, 
she may seek to avoid delivering under the contract. By setting the 
default for unspecified quantity terms at zero, the U.C.C. essentially 
directs courts to find that there is no contract. Yet, this holding also 
completes the contract by allocating bargaining power during renego-
tiation to the seller.  
 If the buyer still wants the seller to deliver the goods, she will 
have to pay the seller enough to compensate her for the increased 
cost of delivery. If suitable substitutes are available, the buyer may 
choose to purchase the goods from another seller instead, but if the 
buyer has made relationship-specific investments, this option, too, 
may be unattractive. In short, the bargaining power of the parties 
                                                                                                                      
 26. U.C.C. § 2-305 (2005).  
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will depend on (1) the contractual default rule, (2) the parties’ rela-
tive relationship-specific investments, and (3) the ease of finding al-
ternative contracting parties during the renegotiation stage.27  
D.   The Overinvestment Problem 
 As discussed in Part II.B, economists long have been concerned 
with problems of underinvestment and holdup. However, the eco-
nomic and legal literature reveals a competing concern for overin-
vestment—the idea that the damage remedy might encourage parties 
to invest too much in a contractual relationship.28  As is the case with 
underinvestment, the overinvestment problem stems from the inabil-
ity of parties to make complete contracts.  
 The intuition behind the overinvestment problem is that, under 
some circumstances, it will be efficient for one party to the contract 
to breach or, alternatively, renegotiate and buy her way out of the 
contract. This will be true for a seller, for example, if another buyer 
offers substantially more for a good than the good is worth to the 
original buyer. If the parties can renegotiate without cost, they will 
make the efficient breach decision no matter the legal remedy. How-
ever, the contractual remedy may distort the parties’ investment de-
cisions and lead to too much investment.  
 Overinvestment occurs when it is efficient ex post for the parties 
to trade less than the contract specifies. If the contract is then en-
forced through a damage remedy, the investing party gets a return 
on his investment, even though the investment lacks social value. 
Trade with someone else is optimal; yet, the relationship-specific in-
                                                                                                                      
 27. Although we believe that, as a general rule, courts and commentators have insuf-
ficiently explored the role of relationship-specific investment and holdup problems when 
struggling with theories of contractual default rules, we do not write on an entirely clean 
slate. See, e.g., Ayres & Gertner, supra note 14, at 729-30 (arguing that courts could use 
gap-filling default rules to address economists’ concerns over contractual incompleteness 
and demonstrating how the choice of default rule could impact contracting parties’ strate-
gic reluctance to enter into contingently complete contracts); Ben-Shahar, supra note 3, at 
411-20 (proposing a prodefendant default rule that protects partial agreements, arguing 
that such a default rule better reflects the intent of the parties; permits parties to break 
down big commitments into smaller, more palatable commitments; and, most importantly 
for our purposes, promotes relationship-specific investment); Edlin & Reichelstein, supra 
note 4, passim (showing how the appropriate quantity choice can, under certain conditions, 
perfectly balance the overinvestment and underinvestment incentives); Goetz & Scott, su-
pra note 2, at 1114 (proposing that courts interpret best efforts clauses as an obligation to 
invest at the joint maximization volume—i.e., at the level that would be attained in the in-
tegrated firm and specifically analogizing the role of gap-filling default rules to the role of 
vertical integration).   
 28. See William P. Rogerson, Efficient Reliance and Damage Measures for Breach of 
Contract, 15 RAND J. ECON. 39, 47-49 (1984) (showing that expectation and reliance dam-
ages induce overinvestment, even if the parties can renegotiate the contract); Steven Shav-
ell, Damage Measures for Breach of Contract, 11 BELL J. ECON. 466, 469-72 (1980) (analyz-
ing overinvestment and breach decisions, assuming parties cannot renegotiate).  
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vestment has value only if the two original parties continue to 
trade.29  In a complete contract, the investing party would account for 
the fact that the investment lacks value in some future contingencies 
and invest less.30 Accordingly, if they are to encourage the optimal 
level of relationship-specific investment, contractual default rules 
must not only address the underinvestment and holdup problems, 
but they must be sensitive to problems of overinvestment as well.  
 The RSI default performs both of these functions better than ex-
isting default rules. As noted, the RSI default encourages relation-
ship-specific investment by construing incomplete contractual terms 
in favor of the relationship-specific investor. At the same time, three 
aspects of the rule avoid exacerbating the overinvestment problem.  
 First, the notice requirement of the RSI default provides the non-
investing party with bargaining power in the relationship as well. 
This is because the investing party gains the benefit of the default 
only if she has advised the noninvesting party of her plans to make 
such an investment and the noninvesting party does not object. This 
notice condition provides the noninvesting party with some leverage 
during renegotiation and should cause the investing party to hesitate 
before investing too much in the relationship. Indeed, only when the 
investment will create a surplus that the parties can share will the 
noninvesting party sign off on the investment. Otherwise, the nonin-
vesting party has an incentive to object. When the noninvesting 
party fails to object, she essentially binds herself not to hold up the 
investing party and, instead, sells her right to hold up in return for 
some side payment. It is the noninvesting party’s ability to commit 
that creates the additional gains from trade.31   
                                                                                                                      
 29. Edlin and Reichelstein show that, when parties set price and quantity in a con-
tract, the parties themselves can balance the overinvestment and underinvestment prob-
lems, even if they cannot contract on the investment levels. Edlin & Reichelstein, supra 
note 4, at 482-91. The authors demonstrate that, when only one party makes a relation-
ship-specific investment, the optimal quantity—the quantity selected by the parties ex 
ante—perfectly balances these two effects under either expectation damages or specific 
performance. Id. When both contracting parties make relationship-specific investments, 
specific performance (and the appropriately selected contract quantity) achieves the ap-
propriate balancing, assuming certain conditions. Id. at 491-94. The Edlin and Reichelstein 
proposal, unlike the RSI default, cannot help parties who fail to specify a quantity term or 
who cannot determine which quantity term perfectly balances the two effects. 
 30. For an example, see A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 33-37 (3d ed. 2003). 
 31. The notice decision and resulting investment can happen at any point in the rela-
tionship. If, for example, circumstances change three years into the contractual relation-
ship that make an investment profitable, a party can provide notice at that point in time. 
Notice can even occur at the time of contract formation. Notice can be actual or construc-
tive. Actual and constructive notice requirements are woven throughout property and con-
tract law. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-206(1)(b) (2005) (requiring the seller to notify the buyer if 
the shipment of nonconforming goods is an accommodation rather than an acceptance); § 2-
706(3) (requiring a seller to notify the buyer if it intends to engage in a private resale to 
mitigate the cost of the buyer’s breach); WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK & DALE A. WHITMAN, THE 
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 This notice idea is not foreign to contract law. Rather, it mimics the 
waiver and estoppel doctrines.32 In a loan contract, for example, if the 
lender repeatedly accepts late payment on the debt without objection, 
some courts will find that the lender has implicitly “waived” the pay-
ment condition.33 Alternatively, the court might find that the lender is 
“estopped” from using the late payment as grounds for acceleration of 
the debt.34 Under either doctrine, the failure to object prevents the 
lender from strictly enforcing the condition. Similarly, under the RSI 
default, if a party fails to object to an investment, it forfeits the ability 
to use that investment later to hold up the other party.  
 Second, the overinvestment problem rests on an assumption that 
the damage remedy fully protects the nonbreaching party’s expec-
tancy interest: that is, the theory assumes that damages make the 
nonbreaching party indifferent between performance and breach. In 
reality, this assumption is rarely satisfied. Litigation costs, specifi-
cally attorney fees, make it expensive to pursue a contract claim. 
Under the American system, these costs are not recoverable. In addi-
tion, the proof requirements for damages—that is, certainty and 
foreseeability—reduce the nonbreaching party’s recovery. Because of 
these aspects of the damage remedy, the nonbreaching party is 
rarely fully compensated.35 This lack of full compensation reduces the 
expected return on specific investment, reducing the incentive to in-
vest too much. 
 Finally, as Aaron Edlin has demonstrated, parties can control 
overinvestment themselves through up-front deposits.36 Such depos-
its ensure that the noninvesting party sues for breach and the invest-
ing party pays damages. These litigation positions impact the in-
vestment calculus. To see how this works, suppose that the nonin-
vesting party makes a large deposit on the contract. Completing per-
formance, then, is cheap for the noninvesting party; it only involves a 
small payment. As a result, the noninvesting party has little incen-
tive to breach. If it occurs at all, breach will be the result of the in-
vesting party’s failure to perform. The investing party is then on the 
hook for compensatory damages. After paying these damages, any 
                                                                                                                      
LAW OF PROPERTY § 11.10 (3d ed. 2000) (describing the legal requirements needed to be-
come a bona fide purchaser, one of which is the absence of constructive or actual notice of a 
prior unrecorded conveyance).  As such, a court could use the same factual inquiry to de-
cide notice under the RSI default as is done in these other areas of law.  
 32. On the subtle differences between these two doctrines, see JEFFREY FERRIELL & 
MICHAEL NAVIN, UNDERSTANDING CONTRACTS 434-43 (2004).  
 33. See, e.g., Morgan v. Bryant, 673 S.W.2d 129, 130 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984). 
 34. See, e.g., Mercedes-Benz Credit Corp. v. Morgan, 850 S.W.2d 297, 299-300 (Ark. 
1993). 
 35. See Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Embedded Options and the Case 
Against Compensation in Contract Law, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1428, 1448-49 (2004). 
 36. Edlin, supra note 4, at 99.  
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left over surplus—the residual—goes to the breaching party, the in-
vestor. Because the deposit makes the investing party the residual 
claimant, she refrains from excessive investment.  
 Edlin also shows that the parties can counter the underinvest-
ment problem by specifying a contract for delivery of a high quality 
or large quantity of the good.37 In this case, it is never efficient to 
trade more than the contract specifies; so, underinvestment ceases to 
be a problem.  
 However, the RSI default is superior to the high quality/large 
quantity method of addressing the overinvestment problem in two 
important respects.  First, a contract containing the optimal quality 
and/or quantity term proposed by Edlin may be quite costly and, in 
some cases, even impossible to write. It requires the parties to set a 
quantity and/or quality at a level where they will never want to trade 
more than the quantity or quality initially specified. This may be a 
very difficult task at the time of contract formation. The RSI default, 
in contrast, does not require the parties to even consider the under-
investment problem at contract formation. Instead, the court pro-
vides the commitment device after the fact. Second, Edlin’s high 
quality/large quantity solution to underinvestment does not work in 
cases where the parties do not specify a quantity or quality. In many 
contractual contexts—such as agreements to agree and requirement 
and output contracts—the parties do not agree on quantity at con-
tract formation.  
 As elaborated in Part I of this Article, however, the RSI default 
employs Edlin’s deposit insight to allow contracting parties to limit 
the impact of the RSI default. If, despite the notice requirement, the 
parties anticipate that overinvestment is still likely to occur, they 
can use deposits to restrict excessive investment.  
III.   THE RSI DEFAULT IN PRACTICE—DOCTRINAL APPLICATIONS 
 Our goal in this Part is twofold: first, to illustrate the application 
of the RSI default through concrete examples using hypotheticals 
and well-known cases, and second, to demonstrate the relationship 
between the RSI default and existing rules and mechanisms of con-
tract interpretation, including good faith.  As will be shown, rather 
than increasing the burden on courts, the RSI default can aid courts 
in analyzing the types of cases they face everyday, such as allega-
tions of bad faith or opportunism, by identifying those circumstances 
in which opportunistic threats are most credible.   
 We begin in Part III.A with the most “incomplete” of all arrange-
ments: the agreement to agree. Through the example of Krantz v. BT 
                                                                                                                      
 37. Id. 
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Visual Images, L.L.C.,38 we demonstrate the superiority of the RSI 
default as compared to other defaults, including standard majori-
tarian defaults, information-forcing defaults, prodefendant defaults, 
and the traditional common law rule of nonenforcement.  Part III.B 
considers how the RSI default informs good faith and Part III.C ex-
tends this analysis to the specific case of requirements and output 
contracts. Part III.D concludes with a discussion of general contract 
interpretation. The discussion in Part III thus moves from the most 
specific context where the RSI default applies—agreements to 
agree—to the most general case of contract interpretation.  
A.   Agreements to Agree 
 This Part considers, in detail, a case involving contractual incom-
pleteness that has received much attention from courts and commen-
tators—Krantz v. BT Visual Images, L.L.C.39 By examining the likely 
impact of the case holding on the problems of relationship-specific 
investment and holdup, this Part demonstrates that Krantz was cor-
rectly decided. However, as in many cases of contractual incomplete-
ness, the court’s failure to analyze the case in a manner that ac-
counts for relationship-specific investment and holdup problems 
thwarts the development of a clear doctrine to account for the results 
in indefiniteness cases. As a result, courts are forced to rely on vague 
notions of whether the contract is sufficiently definite or the incom-
plete terms sufficiently material, undermining predictability in the 
law and leading to inconsistent rulings.  
 In Krantz, both the plaintiff, Krantz, and the defendants, BT, were 
marketers of telecommunications systems and components.40 Begin-
ning in 1994, the plaintiff agreed to become a distributor for the de-
fendants, purchasing videoconferencing equipment manufactured by 
BT for resale to customers.41 Thereafter, the plaintiff established a 
sales account with Kaiser Permanente, recommending, selling, and in-
stalling telecommunications products to Kaiser that were manufac-
tured by the defendants and other companies.42 Rather than supplying 
Kaiser with “off the shelf” products, however, the plaintiff learned to 
customize videoconferencing equipment for Kaiser, using a variety of 
component software and hardware supplied by the defendants and 
                                                                                                                      
 38. 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 209 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001). 
 39. Id. A Westlaw search on March 4, 2005, revealed over 200 citations to Krantz. See 
also Scott, supra note 12, at 1656-57 (discussing Krantz). 
 40. Krantz, 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 211. 
 41. Id.   
 42. Id. at 212.  
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other manufacturers.43 Eventually, the plaintiff was able to design a 
custom videoconferencing system specifically for Kaiser’s use.44  
 At the plaintiff’s suggestion, the plaintiff and the defendants 
agreed to submit a joint bid to supply twenty-four custom videocon-
ferencing systems for Kaiser’s use in its Kansas City and Denver op-
erations areas.45 The parties agreed that the defendants would sup-
ply the BT components used in the Kaiser system with the plaintiff 
providing any remaining components and assembling and installing 
the system.46 In order to increase its chances of winning the bid, the 
plaintiff agreed to reduce its distributor fees for the Kaiser bid, and 
the parties further agreed to share jointly in all subsequent business 
with Kaiser and its affiliates.47 Finally, the plaintiff and the defen-
dants agreed that, in the event their joint Kaiser bid was successful, 
they would negotiate product margins and price terms.48  
 The plaintiff thereafter shared with the defendants his ideas, con-
figurations, and designs developed for the Kaiser bid.49 However, af-
ter the defendants obtained this information, they informed the 
plaintiff that they would submit the bid to Kaiser on their own.50 Al-
though the trial court ruled that this “agreement to agree” was too 
indefinite to enforce, the appellate court disagreed and reversed, rea-
soning that the parties had no choice but to draft an indefinite 
agreement because “it remained to be seen whether the joint pro-
posal would be accepted.”51  
 Analyzing Krantz, along with a sample of eighty-nine other cases, 
Bob Scott argues that the factor driving these case outcomes is 
whether the contract is incomplete due to exogenous or endogenous 
factors.52 When the contract is incomplete due to exogenous events 
outside of the contracting parties’ control, Scott notes that courts 
typically enforce the incomplete contract.53 By contrast, when con-
tractual incompleteness is endogenous to the contract—because the 
parties inadvertently or purposely ignored verifiable information 
that could have been used to complete the contract at relatively low 
                                                                                                                      
 43. Id.  
 44. Id. 
 45. Id.  
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. Because of this threat, the plaintiff agreed to onerous changes in the joint bid 
contract that substantially reduced his profits from the venture. Id. at 212-13. Although 
the trial court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on this point, the 
appellate court ruled that the plaintiff had raised a genuine issue of material fact as to du-
ress. Id. at 218. 
 51. Id. at 218. 
 52. See Scott, supra note 12, at 1656-57.   
 53. Id.  
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cost—courts refuse to fill in the resulting gaps and hold the contract 
unenforceable.54  
 However, the court’s ruling can be defended on other grounds 
that we believe hold more promise for inducing efficient investment 
levels.55 The plaintiff in this case, by sharing his expertise relating to 
Kaiser and its custom videoconference needs with the defendants, 
made a relationship-specific investment. That investment increased 
the total value of the Kaiser bid to all concerned, including Kaiser 
(who presumably could receive a better customized end-product due 
to the plaintiff’s efforts) and the defendants (whose possibility of 
submitting a winning bid was significantly enhanced through the 
plaintiff ’s sharing of his expertise). When the defendants tried to 
hold up the plaintiff by threatening to use the information provided 
by the plaintiff to submit their own bid, they deprived the plaintiff of 
the value of his relationship-specific investment.  
 The elements required for application of the RSI default are all 
present in Krantz. First, by sharing his acquired expertise with the 
defendants, the plaintiff made a relationship-specific investment. In 
other words, plaintiff ’s investment in acquiring and then sharing 
with the defendants his knowledge and expertise relating to Kaiser‘s 
videoconferencing needs loses substantial value unless plaintiff ’s re-
lationship with the defendants continues.  This is true even if plain-
tiff were to submit a bid on his own or with another partner—once 
shared, plaintiff no longer holds a monopoly on this information. As a 
result, he must compete with another bidder (the defendant) and 
charge competitive rates for products and services that were devel-
oped based on plaintiff ’s previously unique expertise relating to Kai-
ser’s videoconferencing needs. The plaintiff would not have shared 
his expertise with the defendants if he believed that the defendants 
might later be free to submit a bid to Kaiser on their own, without 
compensating the plaintiff in any way for his shared information.  
 Second, the plaintiff provided the defendants with the requisite no-
tice. In fact, the plaintiff informed the defendants at several different 
stages of their relationship of his efforts (and eventual success) in de-
veloping custom videoconferencing for Kaiser.56 Later, by sharing his 
expertise relating to Kaiser’s specific videoconferencing needs with the 
defendant (a move that quite obviously would pay off only if the rela-
tionship between the plaintiff and the defendants continued), the de-
                                                                                                                      
 54. Id. at 1657.   
 55. It is not clear to us why the information at issue in Krantz—margins and product 
prices—was unavailable to the parties simply because they did not yet know whether their 
bid would be successful. Admittedly, however, the facts of the case are complicated and not 
sufficiently discussed by the court.   
 56. Krantz, 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 212. 
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fendants were fully aware at the time they entered into the contract 
that the plaintiff had made a relationship-specific investment. 
 The Krantz court correctly found that the contract was enforce-
able.57 The RSI default would direct the court even further, however.  
Under the RSI default, in determining which product margins and 
price terms to supply, the court should construe those indefinite 
terms in a manner that favors the plaintiff. Examining the results 
that would occur in Krantz under the various potential default rules 
demonstrates the superiority of the RSI default in this instance.  
 For the purposes of the following illustrations, assume that the 
plaintiff and the defendant each advocate two different credible in-
terpretations of the price and margin terms, supported by testimony 
of expert witnesses.58 The plaintiff’s interpretation would award the 
plaintiff $1000 under the contract, and the defendant’s would award 
the plaintiff $200 under the contract.  
 Under the traditional common law approach to indefiniteness, the 
court would refuse to enforce the contract, as, in fact, was the trial 
court’s ruling in Krantz.59 In this situation, however, the traditional 
common law approach is the worst possible outcome, because it 
forces the plaintiff to forgo all the benefits of his relationship-specific 
investment. Rather than encouraging relationship-specific invest-
ment, the traditional common law default rule discourages such in-
vestment and encourages holdup. 
 Similarly, a court applying a penalty default rule, because it be-
lieved that the parties had purposely attempted to shift the costs of 
completion onto the courts by leaving the product price and margin 
terms incomplete, would refuse to enforce the contract.60 As under 
the traditional common law rule, this result discourages relationship-
specific investment and encourages holdup problems. 
                                                                                                                      
 57. See id. at 218.  
 58. Of course, the best outcome for the defendants is a ruling that the contract is too 
indefinite to enforce. Such a ruling would allow the defendants to use the plaintiff ’ s ac-
quired expertise, submit an independent bid, and still avoid liability to the plaintiff. How-
ever, the defendants’ next best argument presumably would be to argue for price and mar-
gin terms that favor the defendants. Because the Krantz opinion addresses only the mo-
tions regarding enforcement, we do not know what price and margin terms (other than 
nonenforcement) were advocated by the defendants. However, we provide hypothetical ar-
guments here regarding the preferred price and margin terms of each party in order to ex-
plore and distinguish the application of the various default rules.  
 59. See Krantz, 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 217.  
 60. A court might also apply a penalty default rule if it believed one party to the con-
tract possessed the information necessary to complete the product price and margin terms 
but failed to supply the information in the hopes of garnering a larger fraction of the gains 
from trade. However, there is no evidence of such information asymmetry in Krantz. In 
fact, the court explicitly found that the contract was an “agreement to agree,” implying 
that both parties had consented to the incomplete contractual language. Id. at 218. 
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 Under a mimicking or traditional majoritarian default rule, the 
court would enforce the contract, filling in price and margin terms 
that the parties would have agreed to if they had been able to cost ef-
fectively do so. Because the court generally does not know what the 
parties would have agreed to, it is likely to apply terms of commercial 
reasonableness, trade usage, and the like. In this case, the court 
might look to similar contracts to see what other parties in similar 
contracts might agree to. However, there may not be sufficient in-
formation about similar parties in similar contracts, especially when 
one considers the plaintiff ’s relationship-specific investment—the 
sharing of his information and expertise with the defendants that 
permitted the successful joint bid.  
 Because both parties have credible claims and expert testimony, 
the court might simply average the two claims, awarding the plain-
tiff $600 under the contract. However, the court has no reliable way 
of discerning whether this award reflects the amount that the plain-
tiff would have demanded in order to be induced into ex ante rela-
tionship-specific investment. If $600 is too low an estimate, then 
similar contracting parties will be reluctant to make such invest-
ments in the future. Given the uncertainty on this point, the court 
should apply the plaintiff ’s preferred terms, provided that they are 
credible and supported by evidence.  
 A court applying the prodefendant default rule advocated by Omri 
Ben-Shahar would similarly enforce the contract but would fill in the 
incomplete terms differently.61 Under a prodefendant default rule, 
the court would allow the plaintiff to enforce the contract, but the 
best price term that he could get would be the price advocated by the 
defendant, in this case $200. In the present case, this outcome is 
even worse than the outcome under a majoritarian rule. The default 
rule favors the defendant, even where the plaintiff is the one who has 
made the relationship-specific investment. As a result, the defendant 
is the party with the most ex post bargaining power and the party 
most apt to engage in holdup behavior, as occurred in Krantz. As a 
result, the plaintiff is the party most likely to be forced to sue in or-
der to recoup his relationship-specific investment. To construe the 
contract against him—while superior to the traditional common law 
approach of nonenforcement—actually reinforces the unequal ex post 
bargaining position of these parties, rather than improving on it.62 
                                                                                                                      
 61. Ben-Shahar criticizes the traditional common law rule that agreements to agree 
are unenforceable by demonstrating that such partial agreements may induce parties to 
ultimately reach a better, more complete contract. Ben-Shahar, supra note 3, at 390-92.  
He proposes instead a prodefendant default rule that protects partial agreements. Id.  
 62. We recognize that the prodefendant default is designed to serve other important 
purposes and, in the absence of a relationship-specific investment, may be an appropriate 
means to address partial agreements. However, in cases in which one party has made an 
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 Finally, a court applying the RSI default would adopt the plaintiff’s 
price terms, here $1000. Because there is some ambiguity as to the 
benefit that the plaintiff actually anticipated under the contract, it is 
possible that this awards the plaintiff too much.63 However, by resolv-
ing this ambiguity in favor of the party who has made the relation-
ship-specific investment, the court encourages such investment. At the 
same time, the defendants, by knowingly entering into an incomplete 
contract with a counterparty who has informed them that he has made 
a relationship-specific investment, have already contemplated and 
agreed to bear the risk of incomplete contractual terms.  
 Put another way, if the defendants wanted to avoid having the in-
complete terms construed in the plaintiff ’s favor, the RSI default 
provided them with that option. At the time that the defendants en-
tered into the contract (already aware of the plaintiff ’s relationship-
specific investment), they would have known that any incomplete 
terms would be construed in the plaintiff ’s favor. As such, the RSI 
default puts the burden of attempting to clarify the contract terms on 
the defendants, as the non-RSI party. 
B.   The General Good Faith Obligation 
 The doctrine of “good faith” in contract law is the subject of nu-
merous scholarly articles and much judicial hand-wringing.64 The Re-
statement (Second) states, “Every contract imposes upon each party a 
duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its en-
forcement.”65 The U.C.C. provides a bit more, defining good faith as 
“honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial stan-
dards of fair dealing.”66  
 Unfortunately, these standards provide little traction for a court 
making a good faith inquiry. Courts inevitably face the thorny issue 
of whether certain actions constitute a violation of good faith. In 
many cases, the articulation of the good faith standard turns on op-
portunism—a concept courts rarely define.67 
                                                                                                                      
RSI, this Article urges courts to abandon both the traditional common law rule of nonen-
forcement and the prodefendant default rule in favor of the RSI default. 
 63. As noted, the court should analyze only the range of credible interpretations as-
serted by both parties. It should not adopt any interpretation advocated by the relation-
ship-specific investor, regardless of its absurdity and lack of evidentiary support.  Although 
this requires some fact-finding and judgment by the court as to the range of credible inter-
pretations, courts already engage in this type of decisionmaking when applying majori-
tarian defaults.   
 64. See sources cited supra note 10. 
 65. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981). 
 66. U.C.C § 1-201(b)(20) (2005). 
 67. See, e.g., Kham & Nate’s Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank of Whiting, 908 F.2d 
1351, 1357 (7th Cir. 1990) (“ ‘Good faith’ is a compact reference to an implied undertaking 
not to take opportunistic advantage in a way that could not have been contemplated at the 
time of drafting, and which therefore was not resolved explicitly by the parties.”); Jordan v. 
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 The RSI default helps courts formulate and apply the good faith 
standard by identifying those instances where opportunism, in the 
form of holdup, is most likely to occur. By directing courts to protect 
parties that have made RSIs, the RSI default provides courts with a 
better test than the more generalized pronouncements of the Re-
statement and U.C.C. Furthermore, the RSI insight in some ways 
lessens the burden on courts confronted with claims of opportunistic 
behavior.  As demonstrated in Part II.A, contracting parties have an 
incentive to behave opportunistically when one party has some ex 
post bargaining leverage over the other. That leverage sometimes 
arises from the fact that one party to the contract has made a rela-
tionship-specific investment. In other words, not all complaints of 
opportunism by a contracting party are credible and deserving of 
court action.  By identifying those cases where the incentives to hold 
up a contracting counterparty are present, the RSI default restricts 
the machinery of the good faith doctrine to cases where protection 
from opportunism is actually needed to promote efficient investment.  
 Take, as an example, the case of Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Gulf Oil 
Corp.68 In that case, a supplier of airline fuel, Gulf Oil, entered into a 
requirements contract with Eastern Air Lines.69 At certain airports, 
Gulf Oil was required to supply all of the fuel Eastern required.70 In 
turn, Eastern was obligated to buy fuel exclusively from Gulf Oil.71 
As with all requirements contracts, the parties did not specify a fixed 
contractual quantity.72 After the government instituted price con-
trols, Eastern began “fuel freighting.”73 Under this practice, Eastern 
jets would carry excess fuel if the price at the Gulf station was higher 
than the price at the plane’s prior location.74 In essence, Eastern ma-
nipulated its requirements for Gulf Oil. One issue before the court 
was whether fuel freighting violated the “good faith” standard im-
                                                                                                                      
Duff & Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429, 438 (7th Cir. 1987) (“The element of good faith dealing 
implied in a contract . . . is not a version of the Golden Rule, to regard the interests of one’s 
contracting partner the same way you regard your own. An employer may be thoughtless, 
nasty, and mistaken. Avowedly opportunistic conduct has been treated differently, how-
ever.”); Lo Bosco v. Kure Eng’g Ltd., 891 F. Supp. 1020, 1028 (D.N.J. 1995) (“[The good 
faith] cases are based on the policy of giving a contract legal effect where the parties have 
evidenced an intent to be bound or protecting a reliance interest against a promisor’s op-
portunism.” (citation omitted)). The same difficulties arise in the corporate context. See Deb-
orah A. DeMott, Puzzles and Parables: Defining Good Faith in the MBO Context, 25 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 15, 19 (1990) (“A key component of business judgment analysis—good faith—
has always been a concept arguably unequalled for its malleability and formlessness.”).  
 68. 415 F. Supp. 429 (S.D. Fla. 1975). 
 69. Id. at 434-35.    
 70. Id. at 435. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id.  
 73. Id. at 436. 
 74. Id.  
746  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:725 
 
plicit in requirements contracts.75 Yet, like other courts attempting to 
determine whether contracting parties have acted in good faith, the 
Eastern court had no good test for determining “good faith.”  
 According to the Eastern court, Gulf found the requirements con-
tract initially advantageous, because it provided “a long term outlet 
for a capacity of jet fuel coming on stream from a newly completed re-
finery.”76 However, after the price of fuel skyrocketed, Gulf sought to 
renegotiate the price of fuel in the contract.77 Eastern refused to re-
negotiate and continued to freight fuel, knowing that Gulf was in 
some ways locked into the relationship with Eastern and would have 
a tough time finding an alternative, long-term source for fuel pro-
duced by its refinery.78 In other words, Eastern had leverage in the 
renegotiation due to Gulf’s investment in the refinery—an invest-
ment that may or may not have been relationship specific.   
 It is not clear from the facts of the case whether the Gulf refinery 
was built specifically to fit the needs of Eastern, and the court did 
not attempt to discover this information. Instead, the court reasoned 
that fuel freighting was an established industry practice, as well as 
part of the Eastern/Gulf course of dealing and course of performance 
in other contracts. As such, the burden was on Gulf to ensure that 
the contract limited fuel freighting if that provision was desired by 
Gulf.  In other words, the court found that Gulf had given implied 
consent to fuel freighting by not limiting it in the contract.   
 Note that this ruling places the burden on Gulf to clarify terms 
upfront. This burden can be costly given that some conditions are 
hard to foresee and/or unlikely to occur. To impose this burden on 
Gulf, as opposed to Eastern, without an analysis of whether one 
party has made a relationship-specific investment that makes them 
vulnerable to holdup by their counterparty may exacerbate the in-
centive for one party to engage in holdup, rather than reduce it.   
 A court applying the RSI default, in contrast, would consider in-
formation regarding the parties’ investments in the contractual rela-
tionship vital to the case outcome.  If Gulf’s investment had been—or 
had become—relationship specific, then (provided that the RSI notice 
requirement had been met) Gulf, rather than Eastern, should get the 
benefit of any ambiguous or missing terms, such as those at issue in 
Eastern.   
                                                                                                                      
 75. Id.  
 76. Id. at 432.  
 77. Id. at 431-32. The parties disputed the exact contours of the pricing arrangement, 
with Gulf claiming that the assumptions underlying the price mechanisms no longer held 
true. Id. at 437-38. 
 78. Id. at 436-37. 
2006]                          INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS 747 
 
 To illustrate, assume that facts were introduced into evidence 
showing that Gulf Oil had trained its workforce to work on Eastern 
jets or located its fueling stations at the Eastern hubs, and that 
Eastern had been made aware of these expenditures and had not ob-
jected.  Under these facts, a court applying the RSI default would not 
allow Eastern to exercise holdup power, and, instead, would construe 
any incomplete contractual terms in favor of Gulf Oil. As a result, the 
court would find that Eastern acted in bad faith by fuel freighting. 
 The application of the RSI default thus promotes two important 
goals.  First, knowing that RSIs are protected by courts in the event of 
contractual incompleteness, Gulf is more likely to incur expenses re-
lated to a relationship-specific investment with Eastern to begin with, 
thus increasing the total value of the contractual relationship for both 
parties—an economically positive result that courts should encourage. 
Second, knowing that courts apply RSI defaults to protect relation-
ship-specific investments, Eastern is less likely to balk at Gulf’s at-
tempts to renegotiate the contract in the first place. The RSI default 
alters the terms of the renegotiation because the anticipated interpre-
tation of “good faith” reallocates some of the bargaining power in the 
renegotiation of the contract to Gulf Oil. By ignoring the ex post bar-
gaining positions of the two parties and focusing instead on Gulf’s im-
plied consent to fuel freighting, the court misses an underappreciated 
use of the good faith standard and contract interpretation more gener-
ally: the ability to induce relationship-specific investment.79 
 As the Eastern example shows, the RSI default improves the ap-
plication of the good faith doctrine. Before invoking the doctrine, the 
RSI default forces a court to consider, explicitly, whether conditions 
for the extraction of rents exist. If not, the doctrine does not apply. By 
informing the good faith doctrine with the RSI default, the court con-
strues incomplete contractual terms, implied and explicit, in favor of 
the party making a relationship-specific investment, thus removing 
the leverage from the noninvesting party in the subset of cases where 
opportunism is likely to occur. 
C.   Requirements and Output Contracts 
 With the Eastern case in mind, let us now turn to requirements 
and output contracts more generally. As noted, in these contracts, 
the parties do not specify quantity. In a requirements contract, the 
                                                                                                                      
 79. Note the analog between the change in bargaining power by contractual interpre-
tation and the allocation of bargaining position by ownership. To ensure that Eastern did 
not hold up Gulf Oil, Gulf Oil could have purchased the assets of Eastern—integrating the 
two firms. Then, when the practice of fuel freighting came up, Gulf would be in a different 
bargaining posture. Gulf could threaten to fire and replace the management of its now-
subsidiary, Eastern, if it manipulated fuel requirements. In terms of bargaining power, the 
RSI default does the same thing, reducing the need for integration. 
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seller promises to provide all the goods the buyer requires. The buyer 
promises to buy exclusively from the seller. In an output contract, 
the seller promises to sell exclusively to the buyer; the buyer prom-
ises to buy all of the seller’s output. Despite the lack of a quantity 
term, the U.C.C. provides that these contracts are enforceable. Sec-
tion 2-306(1) provides the framework: 
 A term which measures the quantity by the output of the seller 
or the requirements of the buyer means such actual output or re-
quirements as may occur in good faith, except that no quantity un-
reasonably disproportionate to any stated estimate or in the ab-
sence of a stated estimate to any normal or otherwise comparable 
prior output or requirements may be tendered or demanded.80 
 Both requirements and output contracts create the chance for op-
portunistic behavior. In a requirements contract, the buyer might 
demand zero, claiming that she has no requirements under the con-
tract. The courts have held that such a demand passes the good faith 
test if done for a valid business reason. Alternatively, if the contract 
price is less than the market price, the buyer might demand much 
more than the seller expected, hoping to buy the goods at the lower 
requirements contract price and resell them at the higher market 
price. Section 2-306(1) limits this chance for exploitation by the 
buyer: The requirement demand cannot be unreasonably dispropor-
tionate to a stated estimate or a comparable requirement demanded. 
 Unfortunately, neither “good faith” nor “unreasonably dispropor-
tionate” are well defined concepts in these cases. Here, again, the 
RSI default could provide a framework for courts in cases where one 
party has made an investment specific to the contractual relation-
ship, giving courts both more specific guidance regarding how to in-
terpret such cases in the event of a dispute and further alerting 
courts to the instances where one party has an incentive to behave 
opportunistically.  
 Consider a buyer and seller in a requirements contract. After the 
contract is signed, the seller informs the buyer that he intends to 
make a substantial investment in targeting its production to the 
buyer’s needs and the buyer does not object. Later, the buyer claims 
that he “requires” very little, and as a result, will buy from the seller 
only if the seller agrees to a lower price. The seller’s investment cre-
ates leverage for the buyer.  Because the seller may now feel “locked 
into” the relationship with the buyer, the seller has an opportunity to 
hold up the buyer.  
 Under traditional applications of the good faith standard, the 
burden is on the seller to prove bad faith on the part of the buyer.  
                                                                                                                      
 80. U.C.C. § 2-306(1) (2005).  
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However, a court applying the RSI default would consider the par-
ties’ investments in the relationship in reaching a decision.  When, as 
in this hypothetical, the seller has made a relationship-specific in-
vestment, the court would shift the burden of proof to the non-
investing party.  In other words, the buyer must now prove a legiti-
mate business justification for the decreased demand.  Alternatively, 
if it had been the buyer—rather then the seller—who made an RSI, 
the burden would be on the seller to prove bad faith, as it is under 
current good faith analysis.   
 This burden shifting under the RSI default provides a nudge in 
favor of the relationship-specific investor. Hence, it alters the renego-
tiation position, fostering ex ante decisions to invest in the contrac-
tual relationship. At the same time, overinvestment is limited. In the 
case of the buyer’s investment, the buyer must provide notice to the 
seller at the time of the investment that he is contemplating an RSI. 
At that time, the seller can clarify the terms of the requirements con-
tract (establishing a floor and ceiling on the buyer’s demand, per-
haps). Alternately, the seller can object, telling the buyer not to in-
vest. If the seller does neither of these, he has accepted the risk that 
incomplete contract terms will be construed against him during any 
good faith inquiry.   
D.   General Contract Interpretation 
 Contract interpretation is a complex topic and the subject of much 
recent study by law-and-economics scholars.81 It involves many doc-
trines, including misunderstanding,82 the various maxims of inter-
pretation,83 the parol evidence rule,84 and the incorporation and use 
of course of performance, course of dealing, and usage of trade to re-
                                                                                                                     
 81. See, e.g., Mitu Gulati & Stephen Choi, Contracts as Statutes, 104 MICH. L. REV. 
1129 (2006); Avery Wiener Katz, The Economics of Form and Substance in Contract Inter-
pretation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 496 (2004); Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of 
Contract Interpretation, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1581 (2005); Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, 
Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541 (2003).  
 82. Konic Int’l Corp. v. Spokane Computer Servs., Inc., 708 P.2d 932 (Idaho Ct. App. 
1985) (parties have a misunderstanding about the meaning of “fifty-six twenty”); Raffles v. 
Wichelhaus, (1864) 159 Eng. Rep. 375 (Exch. Div.) (parties have a misunderstanding about 
the ship name, Peerless); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 20 (1981). On misun-
derstanding generally, see E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 7.9 (4th ed. 2004). 
 83. On these maxims generally, see JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON 
CONTRACTS § 87 (4th ed. 2001). For a look at the effect of these maxims on the burden of 
proof in contract suits, see Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in 
Contract Design, 115 YALE L.J. 814 (2006). 
 84. See U.C.C. § 2-202 (2005); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 209-210 
(1981). For a model of how to apply the parol evidence rule, see Eric A. Posner, The Parol 
Evidence Rule, the Plain Meaning Rule, and the Principles of Contractual Interpretation, 
146 U. PA. L. REV. 533 (1998). 
750  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:725 
 
solve ambiguities and fill contractual gaps.85 In addition, courts 
sometimes employ various rules of thumb to resolve interpretative 
disputes: rules such as “construe against the drafter.”   
 In this Part, we demonstrate that the RSI default can provide use-
ful guidance to courts when applying these traditional doctrines of 
contract interpretation.  To illustrate, consider the case of Raffles v. 
Wichelhaus86—a chestnut of the first-year contracts course. In Raf-
fles, the buyer and seller agreed to a sale of cotton traveling aboard a 
ship named Peerless.87 There were, in fact, two ships named Peerless 
carrying cotton—one arriving from Bombay to England in October, 
the other in December.88 The seller shipped its cotton on the Decem-
ber Peerless and the buyer refused delivery, claiming that the con-
tract called for delivery on the October Peerless.89  
 Concluding that the parties meant materially different things, the 
court found that there was no contract.90 As discussed in Part II.C, 
this holding obligationally completes the contract. The court specified 
the rights and obligations of the parties (no delivery) under an un-
foreseen contingency (two boats named “Peerless”). Because of this 
ruling, the buyer was not obligated to take delivery, and his refusal 
did not constitute a breach.  
 Of course, it still may be efficient for the parties to trade the cot-
ton shipped aboard the December Peerless and they may, in fact, 
complete that trade. But the court’s interpretation puts the seller in 
a weaker bargaining position during renegotiation of the contract. 
The seller, not the buyer, will have to give up something to induce 
the buyer to trade in the absence of a contractual obligation.   
 Alternatively, the court could have found a contract on the seller’s 
terms—the December Peerless. Now, in contrast, the court’s holding 
places the seller in a better bargaining position. So, what should the 
court have done in the Peerless case? 
 Under the RSI default, the court would have considered whether 
either party invested in the relationship and, if so, whether the other 
party had notice of that investment. If this occurred, the court should 
construe “Peerless” in favor of that party. This interpretative move 
forces the court to confront and mitigate the underlying problems 
stemming from contractual incompleteness.  
 There is no evidence that either party in Raffles made a relation-
ship-specific investment, nor did the court look for one. At the same 
                                                                                                                      
 85. See U.C.C. § 2-208 (2005) (listing the interpretative hierarchy among course of 
performance, course of dealing, and usage of trade). 
 86. 159 Eng. Rep. at 375. 
 87. Id.  
 88. Id. 
 89. Id.  
 90. Id. at 376.  
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time, this was not a spot transaction. The buyer and seller had a re-
lationship and might have engaged in and benefited from investment 
expenditures targeted to the needs of their counterparty. That said, 
this contract most likely was about locking in the future price of cot-
ton, with the buyer and the seller each betting the spot price would 
move in their preferred direction. If this were true, the concerns in-
forming the RSI default—reducing holdup and encouraging relation-
ship-specific investment—are not implicated, and the RSI default 
would not apply. In that event, the court should apply one or more of 
the existing principles of general contract interpretation, which pre-
sumably are designed to further other concerns present in those 
types of cases. 
IV.   THE CASE OF BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP-SPECIFIC INVESTMENTS 
 Up to this point, we have discussed only those contracts in which 
one party makes investments specific to the relationship. In many 
long-term contracts, however, both parties invest. Although this type 
of contract is not the primary focus of this Article, we present in this 
Part some preliminary thoughts on how the RSI default might apply 
to this more complicated situation.  
 In a series of papers, economic theorists have specified conditions 
under which optimal investment by both parties can be achieved.91 
The argument is subtle and rests on some unrealistic assumptions 
about the law. The insight, however, provides the building blocks for 
how contract doctrine might deal with long-term contracts involving 
two-sided investments.  
 To illustrate, consider a buyer and a seller, both of whom make 
investments specific to their ongoing relationship: a long-term con-
tract under which seller provides electronic components for use in 
laptop computers manufactured by the buyer.  The buyer may make 
modifications to the computer design that render the laptops more 
compatible with the seller’s components, but at the same time render 
the computers less compatible with other available components.  
Similarly, the seller might redesign or relocate its manufacturing fa-
cilities to facilitate the manufacture of these components for the 
buyer, but these changes are not particularly useful for the compo-
nents that the seller manufactures for clients other than the buyer. 
 If the contract specifies the purchase price for a particular quan-
tity of the components—that is, a price-quantity pair—then this 
represents the starting point for any renegotiation. The models as-
sume that the court will specifically enforce this starting point (the 
first unreasonable assumption about the law).  The models also as-
                                                                                                                      
 91. See Aghion et al., supra note 4; Chung, supra note 4. 
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sume that the contract specifies that one party will get the entire 
surplus from any renegotiation of the contract, referred to as the al-
location of bargaining power in the renegotiation.92 Finally, they as-
sume that parties can commit not to renegotiate the bargaining 
power allocation. Such a commitment is very hard to enforce.   
 Operating under these assumptions, the parties are able to solve 
the two-sided investment problem. The parties have two levers to 
play with (initial allocation and ex post allocation of surplus) and two 
parties to incentivize. Hence, it is not surprising that a contract can 
achieve first best. It works as follows: First, the contract assigns the 
entire surplus from the renegotiation to the buyer. Since the buyer is 
the residual claimant, he invests to make this surplus as large as 
possible. Second, the parties set the initial allocation or starting 
point of the renegotiations to motivate the seller. In general, the 
seller will have a tendency to invest too little, realizing that the en-
tire surplus will go to the buyer. But if the initial allocation or start-
ing point for renegotiation is a high enough quantity (which the 
seller can specifically enforce), she will invest the optimal amount. 
 As noted in Part II.C, however, explicit contractual terms are not 
the only mechanism for defining terms such as these.  Instead, con-
tractual default rules can and do define both the starting point for 
the negotiation and the allocation of surplus in the absence of specific 
contractual provisions on these points, albeit imprecisely. Contrac-
tual default rules and, specifically, the RSI default sets the renego-
tiation bargaining power of the parties, by specifying the starting po-
sitions from which they begin to renegotiate.  What is needed to rep-
licate the solution offered by the economic models, then, is a way to 
assign the surplus from the renegotiation to one party or the other. 
 To do this, one needs to know the factors that affect how parties 
split surplus when bargaining. Economists have many models inves-
tigating this problem.93 The division of surplus usually hinges on the 
cost of disagreement and the parties’ outside options. If either of 
these factors differs for the two parties, the split of the surplus will 
differ.  One way, then, to change the allocation of the surplus from 
contract renegotiation is for the law to change the cost of disagree-
ment by treating the party’s claim differently (perhaps through dif-
ferent statute of limitations or different damage remedies).  
 To illustrate, suppose that the seller could not get punitive dam-
ages for breach of contract, but the buyer could. During renegotia-
tion, the seller would be more apt to settle, hoping to get the renego-
tiation accomplished and avoid the threat of punitive damages. 
                                                                                                                      
 92. Chung, supra note 4, at 1032. 
 93. See, e.g., Ariel Rubinstein, Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model, 50 
ECONOMETRICA 97 (1982). 
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Knowing this, the buyer will offer the seller a smaller share of the 
surplus from the renegotiation. 
 Although our work on the problem of two-sided relationship-
specific investment is still quite preliminary, the economic models 
suggest a tentative doctrinal solution: Set the interpretative defaults 
to favor more trade but treat the remedy availability asymmetrically. 
Rarely, if ever, will the parties want to trade at the quantity sug-
gested in the contract, especially when all the interpretative difficul-
ties are resolved in favor of more trade. Instead, they will want to 
trade a different, lower amount. More importantly, the parties will 
bargain over the surplus gained by renegotiation. The asymmetric 
remedies ensure that the buyer receives the majority of the surplus 
from the renegotiation. Knowing this, the buyer will invest in mak-
ing this surplus as big as possible. With the buyer’s investment taken 
care of, the seller’s investment remains a concern.  However, the in-
terpretative default solves this problem. By interpreting all language 
to favor higher trade, the seller invests as if the quantity traded will 
be high. 
V.   INFORMATIONAL BURDENS OF THE RSI DEFAULT 
 To employ the RSI default, a court needs to know something about 
the parties’ investments in the relationship. In the incomplete con-
tracts literature, however, the common assumption is that the par-
ties cannot contract on investments.94 If, to the contrary, contracting 
on investments is easily accomplished, then the problem of inefficient 
investment goes away because the contract itself would specify the 
level of investment. A failure to invest up to the level called for in the 
contract would constitute breach. Likewise, damages for investment 
above what the contract specified would be limited by the contractual 
terms. 
 Economists suggest that problems of verification render invest-
ments noncontractible. The typical model assumes that investments, 
while observable to the parties ex post, are not verifiable to the court. 
Stated differently, parties cannot prove breach of an investment 
commitment. Since parties cannot show breach, they cannot specify 
and then enforce promises about investments.  
 The RSI default seems to run counter to this verifiability assump-
tion, because the court needs to observe the investment or a proxy for 
the investment in order to apply the default. As other scholars have 
noted, there is not a clear distinction between observability and veri-
                                                                                                                      
 94. See HART, supra note 5, at 26-27. Indeed, in the model we do not assume that 
investment is observable or verifiable. Instead, we suppose that the court observes some 
signal, which is correlated with investment. The model is available at www.law.unc.edu/ 
incompletecontractsmodel. 
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fiability. With enough money spent on information collection, any ac-
tion that is observable can be made verifiable.95  
 If the court can observe and verify investments ex post, why are the 
parties unable to contract on the investments initially and have the 
court enforce those commitments? A critic might argue that, in the ex-
act subset of contracts where the RSI default applies, the parties could 
solve the investment problems themselves ex ante at the contracting 
stage. As a result, the RSI default is unnecessary or even harmful. 
 We are unpersuaded by this argument. In practice, there are 
many reasons why parties fail to explicitly contract on investment 
levels that have nothing to do with observability or verifiability. 
First, the parties might fail to specify investment levels because the 
costs of drafting such provisions may be quite high.  This is especially 
true for parties to deals done under a time constraint. The drafting 
problem is exacerbated when investment is multidimensional, re-
quiring many different levels of investment.  
 Second, raising the issue of investments during contract formation 
might jeopardize completion of the deal.96 A willingness to make rela-
tionship-specific investments signals a level of commitment to the re-
lationship. To avoid the danger of negative signaling, parties might 
instead avoid the issue of investment (and other difficult or conten-
tious issues) during contract negotiation. Similarly, “agreeing to 
agree” on investment levels lets parties work out the other details of 
the contract, fostering some good will during the negotiation.97  
 Third, the use of the RSI default occurs ex post as an interpreta-
tive or gap-filling device. The court need not decide whether the par-
ties breached investment promises. Instead, the court uses the in-
vestments or, more likely, proxies for investments to nudge the in-
terpretation or gap-filling rule in favor of one of the parties. This is a 
much looser requirement than finding a contractual obligation about 
investment levels or measuring them with certainty. As such, it re-
quires less in the way of information about actual investment levels. 
At summary judgment, the parties can introduce evidence of invest-
ments undertaken and the amount of notice given. As in all legal 
disputes, the other party can challenge these findings. The court, 
then, decides whether the evidence is sufficient to warrant use of the 
RSI default. When the contract has no RSIs or proxies for RSIs that 
are observable or verifiable ex post, the RSI default does not apply.  
  
                                                                                                                      
 95. See Scott & Triantis, supra note 83, at 814-21; Shavell, supra note 28, at 468. 
 96. See generally Ben-Shahar, supra note 3, passim (discussing the reasons behind 
“agreements to agree”). 
 97. Id. 
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Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the RSI default does not 
preclude the parties from explicitly contracting on investment levels 
if they so desire. To the contrary, the notice requirement forces par-
ties to clarify the extent of their investment obligations early or lose 
the benefits of the default rule, thus encouraging parties to specify 
their agreement as fully as possible.  
V.   CONCLUSION 
 The literature on relationship-specific investment spans decades.  
This Article links that literature to the legal scholarship on default 
rules to provide a unified framework for thinking about good faith, 
contract interpretation, and gap-filling.   
 Contract doctrines provide the backdrop against which all con-
tract renegotiation occurs.  As such, the doctrines can share a com-
mon underlying function: the inducement of relationship-specific in-
vestment.  The RSI default pushes the doctrines in favor of the rela-
tionship-specific investor, while, at the same time, reducing that 
party’s incentive to overinvest. The latter goal is accomplished by re-
quiring notice of the investment before the benefit of the default rule 
attaches.  
 The RSI insight can aid courts’ good faith analysis by moving that 
inquiry beyond vague notions of fair dealing and opportunism and, 
instead, calls upon courts to focus their attention on those conditions 
under which threats are credible and opportunism is most likely to 
occur. Under the RSI default, a court makes a finding of bad faith 
and sets aside a contract only if the parties prove that the economic 
conditions needed for opportunistic behavior actually exist. 
